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Abstract: The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide neglects 
to include persons with disabilities as a protected group.  Such an omission denies the common 
etymologicali “racial” ancestry shared by those groups included in the Genocide Convention and 
disabled persons.  Further, it denies the historical fact that the Holocaust victimized persons with 
disabilities, along with other categories of groups already protected.  Thus, the Genocide 
Convention should be amended to include disabled persons. 
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 “With the exception of Dr. Jekelius, I spoke to no other physicians about this matter. In 
any case, Dr. Jekelius was fully aware of what was happening and it was unambiguously 
clear from his remarks that he totally endorsed the entire operation against ‘life unworthy 
of life’ and that he was prepared to act as the Nazi state demanded. I finally realized that I 
could not save my child after this conversation. Therefore, I wanted at least to stop my 
child from being carried off somewhere. I also wanted to spare the child any further pain, 
if it had to die. For these reasons, I begged Dr. Jekelius, that if the death of my child 
could not be stopped, that it be quick and painless. He promised me this. I never learned 
whether he himself carried out the deed, or whether he let someone else do it and in what 
manner. I saw my child's corpse. I was struck by the look of pain on his face.” Anny 
Wöld, testimony before the Vienna District Court in proceedings against Drs. Ernst 
Illing, Marianne Turk and Erwin Jekelius, March 1, 1946 (Gallagher, 2004, p. 222). 
 
Introduction 
 
On November 24, 1934, Anny Wöld gave birth to a son who could neither speak nor 
walk.  The cause of his condition was unknown, as was the degree of suffering he might be 
experiencing.  At the age of four, he was admitted by his mother to Gugging, a mental hospital 
and nursing home in Lower Austria.  Ms. Wöld was fully aware of the Nazi enterprise of 
eliminating “life unworthy of life,” the Euthanasie program that would provide the bureaucratic 
skeleton for the mass killing of more than 70,000 mentally and physically disabled persons 
(Gallagher, 2004).  She made several vain appeals in her attempt to halt the execution of her son, 
an execution made possible by the complicity of the German medical community in the Nazi 
national program of racial hygiene.  Indeed, when she confronted Dr. Jekelius, the Director of 
the Vienna City Psychiatric-Neurological Clinic for Children Am Spiegelgrund from 1940-1942 
and member of the Nazi Party, about sparing the life of her son, she could only capitulate in 
futility as he swore allegiance to the demands of the Nazi State in the commission of his civic 
duty.  From Dr. Jekelius, she could secure nothing more than a promise that the killing of “it” 
would be quick and painless.ii 
   
 
Many narratives of the Holocaust, both academic and popular, place principal emphasis 
on the severity of the atrocities committed against Jewish populations, and perhaps justifiably so 
given that Jewish deaths are estimated to be in the realm of 5.3 million.  However, less 
researched is the fact that disabled persons were the first to die (Friedlander, 1995).  The Nazi 
euthanasia maelstrom left, directly and indirectly, over 200,000 dead in its wake (Gallagher, 
2004). 
 
First, clandestine preparation for euthanizing disabled children was conceptualized, 
formalized, and executed.  In October 1939, Hitler “enlarge[ed] the competence of certain 
physicians, designated by name, so that patients who, on the basis of human judgment, are 
considered incurable, can be granted mercy death after a discerning diagnosis” (Friedlander, 
1995, p. 67).  After the children, the adult disabled were killed.  Those killed included persons 
with mental disabilities as well as physical impairments, all lumped together as degenerates and 
liabilities to the state.  The official Nazi euthanasia program lasted from 1939 to the summer of 
1941, after which it could no longer be kept secret.  Hitler ordered the program halted, however 
the killings continued.  Ironically, the killings grew more heinous after formal cessation of the 
program.  They assumed a more ad hoc and haphazard manner, and decisions as to who would 
be killed became the jurisdiction of the individual physician rather than an official review 
committee.  Sadly, the “Children’s Campaign,” the program for the killing of malformed and 
developmentally disabled children, and the killing of disabled adults, continued even after World 
War II ended. 
 
The euthanasia and related programs were the illegitimate progeny of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory and the related principles of eugenics   In 1920, psychiatrist Alfred Hoche 
and lawyer Karl Binding published The Destruction of Life Devoid of Value, imploring the 
German medical establishment to consider not only its role as health-giver, but also as life-taker.  
For them, the dogma of racial hygiene required the ethical physician to impart the gift of death 
on any patient who was deemed terminally ill, mentally incapacitated, or otherwise diseased.  
The “logic” of such opinions was further buttressed, entrenched, and reproduced by cinematic 
portrayals of “benign” euthanasia,iii and even more surreptitiously through negative 
characterizations of the mentally disabled in common mathematics textbooks (Gallagher, 2004).  
An ideology of racial purity and Aryan supremacy permeated the German national conscience, 
and rendered such ethereal notions as race, nation, religion, and disability coextensive insofar as 
they provided a blueprint for the realization of the Nazi purification project.  The echoes of the 
Nazi racial hygiene mantra would reverberate not only through concentration camps in 
Auschwitz and Birkenau, but also in the hallowed halls of the T4 euthanasia center where the 
medical ethics of physicians like Dr. Jekelius were compromised and perverted by a misbegotten 
love of country, and a concomitant piteous human agnosticism toward their patients.iv 
 
With the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention) in 1948, the United Nations memorialized its commitment to 
preventing and punishing “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part” against 
certain social groups (United Nations, 1948, Article 2).  During the Genocide Convention’s 
negotiations, the selection of these groups was contentious.  Ultimately, four groups were chosen 
for protection: national, “ethnical,”v racial, and religious populations.  These group monikers 
   
have been notoriously resistant to precise definition.  Far from being mutually exclusive, they 
suffer from significant conceptual overlap, and have historically context-specific and 
geospatially contingent meanings.  Race, for example, is sufficiently amorphous to reasonably 
encompass Germans (a nationality), Jews (a religious group) and Gypsies (a darker-skinned 
ethnic group) (Schabas, 2000), as the story of the Nazi ideology of racial purity demonstrates.  
Other groups, such as linguistic, political, and, most importantly for our purposes, persons with 
disabilities were denied legal refuge in the Genocide Convention. 
 
Schabas (2000) argues that the inclusion of only four groups in the Convention is 
appropriate for at least two reasons.  First, these are the groups that Rafael Lemkin, the man 
widely regarded as the progenitor of genocide as a legal and political concept, intended to be 
protected from genocidal acts.  Schabas supports this claim with Lemkin’s reference to 
“national” groups in Lemkin’s work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.  Schabas argues that 
“national” was understood to incorporate Jews, given “[t]he historical circumstances and the 
context of Nazi persecution” (p. 113).  Second, Schabas refers to the etymology of the term 
“genocide” itself; it derives from the Greek word genos meaning “race” or “tribe.”  This 
construction comports with the desire to protect groups recognized as “national minorities” (p. 
113) prior to WWI.  Schabas concludes that “[d]iluting the definition, either by formal 
amendment of its terms or by extravagant interpretation of the existing text, risks trivializing the 
horror of the real crime when it is committed” (p. 114). 
 
Schabas’ defense of the limited scope of protection offered by the Genocide Convention, 
particularly with regard to the inclusion of disabled persons, is inadequate.  He argues that 
Lemkin entertained the protection of narrowly circumscribed “national” groups, and Jews were 
clearly meant to be included in “national” given the circumstances of the Nazi extermination 
program.  However, the same Nazi ideology that targeted Jews for extermination targeted 
disabled persons for extermination first, subjecting both disabled children and adults to the same 
rituals of mass killing endured by Jews.  Thus, while it is true that disabled persons were not 
considered a national minority prior to World War II, they should be protected under the 
Genocide Convention because they were killed along with the Jewish and Gypsy “races” under 
the same Darwinian-derived Rassenhygiene program.  Furthermore, the practical manifestation 
of the construction of the genos in the case of Nazi Germany evidences quite clearly the fraternal 
nature of not only race, ethnicity, nationality and religion, but also disability.  All five concepts 
share a common point of intellectual origin and racial animus, and international law regarding 
genocide should be amended to conform accordingly. 
 
To be sure, much progress has been made in the domain of international disability law, 
particularly with the recent adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (Disability Convention).  The landmark convention, adopted December 13, 
2006, formalized the aspirations of persons with disabilities and disability advocates who for 
decades pressured the United Nations to bestow the needed recognition upon the world’s largest, 
and arguably most vulnerable, minority group.  Perhaps most importantly, the Disability 
Convention identifies disabled persons as a legally cognizable group, although heterogeneous in 
its constitution, and places it among race, religion, gender, children, and national minorities in 
the pantheon of fundamentally persecuted world constituencies that require concerted and 
collective effort to achieve equality of opportunity and recognition of human rights.  However, 
   
while the Disability Convention is a landmark document, it falls short of criminalizing 
systematic discriminatory actions taken against persons with disabilities, actions which when 
taken in the aggregate, may result in mass loss of life (United Nations, 2006). 
 
Schabas’ use of the term “dilute” to describe the inclusion of additional groups under the 
aegis of the Genocide Convention is sadly reminiscent of the rhetoric deployed in the Nazi 
regime to “cleanse” Germany of the virus of “useless eaters.”  Indeed, the eyes of the Nazis, 
disabled persons had to be excluded from the polity because their very presence diluted the 
German gene pool.  This paper argues that the inclusion of disabled persons as a group protected 
by the Genocide Convention would not dilute, but purify its stature as a document forged in the 
aftermath of World War II atrocities to prevent and punish the killing of innocents.  The 
intellectual nexus between those groups currently protected and persons with disabilities, bound 
in Darwinian-derived and eugenics-based theories of race supremacy, warrants such an 
amendment.  In addition, contemporary academic literature now recognizes disabled persons as a 
socially stigmatized group entitled to human rights as such, not as atomistic individuals who 
suffer from isolated physical and psychological afflictions. 
 
I will first examine the text of the Genocide Convention itself, with an inspection of key 
terms and phrases, and with significant attention paid to positions for or against the expansion of 
protected groups.  Second, the event that prompted the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the 
Holocaust, will be explored.  Here, the conceptual and practical marriage between race, ethnicity, 
nation, religion, and disability will be discussed, as viewed through the lens of the Nazi Socialist 
ideology and the regime’s euthanasia program.  The influence of ideas of essentialized, 
immutable, and inevitable racial hierarchy, derived from eugenics, will be emphasized to 
demonstrate the common etymological ancestry of the five groups – race, ethnicity, nation, 
religion, and disability – and to substantiate the claim that disabled persons should also be 
protected by the Genocide Convention.  Next, the trajectory of international disability law 
subsequent to the Holocaust will be traced to further bolster the argument that disabled persons 
have gained standing as a “group” in international law worthy of genocide protection, but that 
current law does not offer adequate protections.  This examination will touch on the legal 
paradigm shift from individual “medical” understandings of disability to a more equality-based 
human rights posture toward disability discrimination law.  Finally, I will summarize my 
findings and provide recommendations in my conclusion. 
 
Before I proceed, it may be appropriate to include a note about the relationship between 
race and disability.  Race is conceived of broadly as a social construct in this paper.  I adopt 
Winant’s (1994) minimalist definition; race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes 
sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies. For me, and 
as I interpret the racism promulgated by the Nazi regime during the Holocaust, racism operated 
as the “fetishism” of not only bodies, but also beliefs.  Certain bodies (i.e., Roma, disabled 
persons) were assigned a lower value than others.  Similarly, certain beliefs were assigned a 
lower value (i.e., Judaism).  The assignment of these group values created a clear social 
hierarchy; those of the “pure Aryan race” were citizens while those of the “lower races” had to 
be eliminated. 
 
   
Without question, this brief description is an oversimplification.  To trace the complete 
intellectual history of race and its relationship to disability would be quite an undertaking.  My 
goal here is simply to show that in the specific case of Nazi Germany, the concept of race was 
broad enough to encompass distinctions based on skin color (the more conventional physical trait 
associated with race) as well as ability.  However, I do not assert that race and disability are in 
fact identical or coextensive, even in this particular case.  Such an assertion would not only be 
beyond the purview of this paper, but also arguably intellectually irresponsible.  This paper seeks 
to highlight the similarities between the two concepts and leaves the parsing of the differences 
for another project sufficient in depth and breadth to give such a subject the attention it deserves. 
  
Genocide, Eugenics, and Euthanasia 
The Genocide Convention and Group Inclusion 
As defined by the Genocide Convention, genocide “means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: 
 
a) Killing members of the group. 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part. 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births. 
e) Forcible transferring children of the group to another group” (United Nations, 1948, 
Article 2). 
 
The Genocide Convention punishes not only genocide, but also conspiracy to commit genocide, 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, and complicity in 
genocide (United Nations, 1948, Article 3).  Rulers, public officials, and private citizens may be 
punished under the convention (United Nations, 1948, Article 4).  Whether states can be held 
culpable under the Convention for the act of genocide is debatable.vi  The Convention does not 
require that the members of the group actually be killed, which has led to much confusion.  
However, the action taken must be taken against the group “as such” with intent to destroy, not 
merely against the individual members of the group, or the group for some other reason (e.g., 
political).  To date, 133 states have ratified the convention. 
 
The origin of the concept of genocide is found in the writings of Lemkin.  For him, 
genocide is intended to: 
 
“Signify a coordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves.  The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of social 
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence 
of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, 
and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.  Genocide is directed at 
the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against the 
   
individual, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group” (as 
cited in Rummel, 2006, p. 32). 
 
Rummel makes it clear that the historical backdrop for Lemkin’s conception was the Jewish 
Holocaust and the prevention of similar mass killings that may occur in the future.  Indeed, early 
applications of “genocide” were reserved exclusively for the Jewish Holocaust.  However, 
subsequent interpretations have expanded the ambit of the term, making its precise nature 
nebulous.  Genocide’s meaning has been generalized to include any mass murder by 
government, such as the mass killing of political groups and the unintentional spread of diseases 
to indigenous populations.  The “non-killing” element of the convention has also led to 
“genocide” expansion, including: government policies that let one race adopt children of another 
race, South African apartheid, and deaths in the Soviet Gulag.  To ameliorate the confusion, 
Rummel proposes the term democide, which is more restrictive than genocide because it requires 
that members of the group in question actually be killed and that the killing be done by a 
government.  However, it is also broader in that it includes more groups than those articulated in 
the Convention (Rummel, 2006). 
 
Like Rummel, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) find the Genocide Convention’s definition of 
genocide unwieldy and bereft of academic rigor.  They argue that it is of limited scholarly utility 
because: (1) it fails to distinguish between killing and non-killing, (2) it excludes political groups 
and social classes, (3) the United Nations itself is composed of sovereign states with an inherent 
antagonism toward international judicial institutions, and (4) “the wording of the convention is 
so restrictive that not one of the genocidal killings committed since its adoption is covered by 
it…” (p. 11).  However, most problematic for Chalk and Jonassohn is the convention’s “narrow 
definition of what constitutes a victim group, and potential perpetrators have taken care to 
victimize only those groups that are not covered by the convention’s definition” (p. 11).  They 
define genocide as a “form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends 
to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator” (p. 23).  
This definition envisions no reciprocity from the victim group, the intent to kill all members of 
the victim group, an exclusion of civilian casualties of war, a strict intent requirement, and state 
action. 
 
With regard to the selection of groups that may be the victims of genocide, Chalk and 
Jonassohn’s definition leaves the matter open; the guiding principle is the subjective view of the 
perpetrator.  By placing no ceiling on the number of potential victim groups, their definition 
“allows the inclusion of groups that had not previously been considered under the United Nations 
convention as potential victim groups (e.g., the retarded, the mentally ill, and homosexuals…)” 
(p. 26).  In her 37 case comparative study, Barbara Harff (2003) proposes a definition that pairs 
genocide with politicide: “the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies 
by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending 
authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a communal, political, or politicized 
ethnic group” (p. 58).  This definition seems to permit fewer groups, largely restricted to 
ethnic/racial, religious or political groups, but does include groups that are either self or 
authoritatively defined. 
 
   
This brief review of the Genocide Convention and related literature reveals several 
problematic aspects of how a “group,” which qualifies for protection under the Genocide 
Convention, has been and should be determined.  With regard to the expansion of protected 
groups, any expansion of protected groups, to both strengthen the convention’s legitimacy as a 
deterrent against potential perpetrators of mass killing and provide a foundation for rigorous 
scientific analysis of the prevalence of genocidal episodes, should be undertaken with caution.  
Schabas’ position on expansion is too confining because he opposes any expansion, thus denying 
the dynamic temporally-contingent dimension of group naming, with a result that inhibits growth 
in both ideas of institutional protection for vulnerable populations and efforts at progressive 
scholarship production. 
 
Conversely, Chalk and Jonassohn advocate too broad an expansion, embracing almost 
any group, so long as it is identified as such by the alleged perpetrator.  This definition may be 
viscerally appealing to human rights advocates, but from a legal standpoint its lack of an 
objective measure by which to gauge group membership may leave it impotent in carrying out 
the Genocide Convention’s implicit purpose – to create an agreement under which mass killing 
could be condemned and those populations most susceptible to the scourge could be protected. 
 
Likewise, Harff’s definition is too broad because a political group can be interpreted to 
mean almost any group, and identification of the groups is subjective.  With regard to Chalk and 
Jonassohn, and Harff’s definitions of genocide, Rummel’s admonition that genocide has been 
overly generalized should be seriously considered.  Thus, rather than overexpand the aegis of the 
Genocide Convention and reduce it to a document that becomes resistant to meaningful judicial 
application, the best approach may be to merely add to those groups already protected by the 
convention.  For reasons alluded to above and further elucidated below, disabled persons should 
be included.  Their inclusion would comport with Chalk and Jonassohn’s subjective conception 
of group identification because the Nazis identified disabled persons as a group and proceeded 
with a program for their extermination “as such.” The authors even expressly mention disabled 
persons as a group to be included.  Finally, this position also comports with Harff’s more 
expansive conception of genocide. 
 
Eugenics and the Evolution of German Rassenhygiene 
While the addition of groups to the Genocide Convention is controversial, inclusion of 
disabled persons can be justified because of the common etymological ancestry of the ideas of 
race, nationality, religion, and disability that pervaded intellectual thought and informed state 
policies during the early 20th century.  In his discussion of the underpinnings of the Nazi 
targeting of persons with disabilities, Mostart (2002) identifies six genocidal markers: (a) 
Darwinism and the biology of determinism, (b) eugenics, (c) forced prevention of disability, (d) 
disability propagandized as life unworthy of living, (e) disability as justification for individual 
state-sanctioned murder, and (f) disability as state-sanctioned homicidal health policy.  The 
rudiments of the eugenics movement were an extension of social Darwinist principles of 
biological superiority; biology determined which groups were dominant and environment could 
do little to nothing to alter these outcomes. 
 
   
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, prominent eugenicists and other 
intellectual descendants of Francis Galton were preoccupied with control of those who were 
deemed “unfit.”  For the American eugenics movement, this meant control of biological threats 
such as new Eastern European immigrants, Blacks, and other “degenerate” peoples (Tucker, 
1994).  Eugenicists and politicians alike believed that undisciplined reproduction by 
“undesirable” groups would adulterate American stock because they were inferior to the 
Caucasian race.  Thus, eugenicists supported anti-miscegenation and segregation laws to avoid 
the mongrelization of America.  Like Blacks and Eastern Europeans, “degenerates” were also a 
focus of concern for eugenicists.  A degenerate was defined as one who “fail[ed] chronically in 
comparison with normal persons, to maintain himself or herself as a useful member of the social 
life of the state” (p. 61).  This category included, among others, the feebleminded, insane, 
epileptics, diseased, those with impaired hearing or vision, and cripples.  Invoking quasi-
theological, ethical, and legal justifications, Herbert S. Jennings vilified the defective gene as a 
biological monstrosity: 
 
“The embodiment, the material realization of a demon of evil.  Such a thing must be 
stopped whenever it is recognized.  The prevention of propagation of even one 
congenitally defective individual puts a period to at least one line of operation of this 
devil.  To fail to do at least so much would be a crime” (as cited in Tucker, 1994 p. 69). 
 
Eugenics was also practiced in many of the Nordic states: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and 
Norway all had compulsory sterilization programs by 1926, before they were implemented in 
Nazi Germany (Barnett, 2004). 
 
Academic discussions of race in Germany were not new; race and the study of the 
science of human variation had been occurring since the 1800s (Schafft, 2007).  Schafft argues 
that Germans had utilitarian motives and deployed race to describe human difference because 
“the social categories of Jew, Pole, Serb, Mongol, or Gypsy were of significance to them and 
could be used to justify policies that furthered their economic and political goals” (p. 205).  
Although there was significant intermarriage de jure equality between Jews and other groups in 
pre-Nazi Germany, there did exist a latent anti-Semitism upon which Hitler and his compatriots 
were able to seize.  The trope of “German blood” came to embody the essence of Germanness, 
the cultural conscience of the volk.  In the context of disability, this sentiment was first 
memorialized in the Law for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases, promulgated 
in 1933 (Poore, 2003).  As the Nazi Party took control in 1939, with Hitler appointed Chancellor, 
public vilification of genetic degenerates conflagrated.vii  Two weeks after an address by 
Wilhelm Frick, Ministry of the Interior, to the Expert Advisory Council for Population and Race 
Politics, the Law for the Prevention of Genetically Defective Progeny was enacted (Tucker, 
1994).  The law allowed for the involuntary sterilization of those afflicted with 
“weakmindedness,” schizophrenia, insanity, epilepsy, blindness, deafness, bodily deformities 
and other ailments.  Genetic Health Courts were to decide who should be sterilized. 
 
The institutionalization of the Nazi program of Rassenhygiene continued with the 
creation of medical academies tasked with inculcating dedication to state and race in its 
graduates.  The creation of these academies is emblematic of the Third Reich’s infusion of 
National Socialism with a scientific rationality, the combination of which supplanted 
   
professional ethical allegiances to human life.  The Nuremberg Laws were the crescendo of the 
Third Reich’s formalized racial hygiene project, aimed specifically at the parasitic Jewish 
“counterrace.”  Adopted unanimously by the Reichstag in 1935, the laws forbad marriage and 
extramarital relations between Germans and Jews and disenfranchised German “subjects” who 
were not of German blood.  A quote from Hitler’s Mein Kampf can best help us understand the 
prohibition on interracial marriage: 
 
“A folkish state must therefore begin by raising marriage from the level of continuous 
defilement of the race, and give it the consecration of an institution which is called upon 
to produce images of the Lord and not monstrosities” (as cited in Dawidowicz, 1975, p. 
65). 
 
The Genocide of Disabled Persons Begins 
Disabled children were murdered first.  Shortly after the start of World War II, Hitler 
authorized young Nazi officers Brandt and Bouhler to implement the children’s euthanasia 
program under the auspices of the Office of the Chancellery of the Fuhrer (KdF).  The program 
was classified and clandestine, and operated under the deceptive moniker “Reich Committee for 
the Scientific Registration of Severe Hereditary Ailments” (Friedlander, 1995).  KdF officials, 
Herbert Brack, Hans Hefelmann, and Richard von Hegener, convened a panel of academics to 
review registration forms to determine which children should be sterilized.  Guidelines were 
issued by the German Ministry of the Interior (RMdI), the ministry headed by Wilhelm Frick.  
Under the guidelines, midwives and physicians were required to submit the following 
information on all newborns with medical conditions: name, age, sex, description of the illness, 
details on hospital stay, an explanation of how the child’s function is disrupted by the illness, 
projected life expectancy, and chances for improvement.  A subsequent decree issued by the 
RMdI required the reporting of religion, as well as his relatives’ medical histories (Friedlander, 
1995). 
 
Three self-professed euthanasia adherents, Werner Catel, Hans Heinze, and Ernst 
Wentzler, were medical experts who evaluated registration forms.  Those selected for the 
program – so-called “Reich Committee children” – would then be diverted to children’s killing 
wards, of which Brandenburg-Gordon was the first established in July 1940.  To maintain 
secrecy, parents were advised that their children would be receiving “therapeutic” care.  Instead, 
the children were subjected to medical experiments by the doctors, nurses, and staff at the killing 
hospitals both before and after being killed.  Another child killing ward was established in 
Bavaria later in the year and was headed by Hermann Pfanmueller.  Pfanmueller had previously 
helped to enforce racial and eugenics legislation and conducted tours of his facility to display the 
degeneracy of its inmates.  Such wards were eventually established throughout Germany 
(Friedlander, 1995). 
 
Many of the Reich Committee children were starved to death, with rations withheld.  
However, the preferred method of killing was with medication, specifically luminal, an 
anticonvulsant with sedative and hypnotic properties.  The medication was put in food in high 
doses or delivered via injection.  The actual order to kill was issued by the Reich Committee; 
children with neurological disorders or physical deformities were deemed incurable and were 
   
euthanized.  The criteria used to select children were subjective. Many physicians labored under 
the assumption that certain disabilities prevented a child form leading a productive life when in 
fact, there was scientific evidence to the contrary (Friedlander, 1995). 
 
The killing of disabled adults began in the summer of 1939.  Brant and Bouler, the 
managers of the children’s euthanasia program, again took the lead.  Local governments sent 
reports to the RMdI listing all institutions in which mental patients, epileptics, and the 
feebleminded were held.  As with the children’s program, registration forms were used for all 
potential “patients.”  The following patients who were unable to work and who had these 
conditions were registered: schizophrenia, epilepsy, senile diseases, therapy resistant paralysis 
and syphilis, encephalitis, terminal neurological disorders, all types of feeblemindedness, 
criminal insanity, lack of German citizenship, and lack of German or related blood, including 
Jews, Negroes, Gypsies, hybrids, etc., (Friedlander, 1995).  The collection of these data served 
multiple purposes, not the least of which was to determine the logistics of transporting patients 
from their local medical facilities to the euthanasia wards. 
 
Just as with the child killings, the criteria for selection were subject to widely varying 
interpretations.  Many of those diagnosed with mental disorders were instead physically impaired 
and had their full faculties about them.  This distinction became moot, however, because the 
overarching motive was not to treat, but to sterilize or kill those unable to serve as productive 
members of society as determined by their lack of labor value.  After selection by medical 
experts, the transport office, known as the Gekrat, arranged for the movement to the killing 
facility.  Those of sound mind knew their fate, but had no say in the matter because:  “The insane 
person himself is in no position to judge his situation” (Friedlander, 1995, p. 84).  Relatives and 
guardians, and even some local facility administrators, were deceived into believing that the 
patients were being transported as a precaution for the war.  In reality, these “cripples,” 
“psychotics,” and “psychopaths” were being relocated to T4, the killing center. 
 
The above narrative demonstrates that the Nazi euthanasia program, as well as the 
genocide generally, was no singular bureaucratic proclamation or act.  Rather, it was a process; 
the culmination of series of calculated and reinforcing acts, engineered for the particular purpose 
of racial hygiene and the preservation of those deemed fit.  As Fitzgerald (1999) explains, “[I]n 
relation to people with disability, this may mean that the very narrow psychological sentiment of 
control of people with disability which manifested first in institutionalization (and its associated 
deprivations and abuses) may gain expression in  decidedly more permanent infringement of 
human liberties; the taking of life” (pp. 274-275).  In Nazi Germany, the result was indeed the 
taking of life, on a massive scale and with fabricated justifications.  The narrative also shows 
how ideas of race, ethnicity, nationality, and religion cannot be extricated from ideas of 
disability, either in theory or practice.  These phenomena have traveled similar etymological 
trajectories, from scientific rationales to social constructionism, and all concern the disciplining 
of bodies by states.  Thus, the inclusion of disabled persons as a protected group under the 
Genocide Convention is both reasonable and necessary. 
 
A Convention for Disabled Persons 
Group Recognition and Human Rights 
   
Jones and Marks (1999) remark that “[w]hat it is very important to appreciate is that even 
if there existed a perfect regime of human rights … this is only going to be a small part of what 
is necessary to bring about true equality for people with disabilities” (p. 4).  Their observation is 
a reflection of the sobering truth that de jure protections are simply words on paper and incapable 
by themselves of equalizing humanity.  This impotence is made particularly palpable in the case 
of the United Nations, an institution with no enforcement mechanisms of which to speak.  To be 
sure, advances in international disability theory and law have produced a seismic paradigm shift 
from a narrow “medical” rubric, which regarded disability as an individual affliction, to one in 
which disability is conceived of as a sociopolitical construct requiring a human rights response 
for the protection of a group.  However, “[d]espite being one of the largest minority groups in the 
world, encompassing 600 million persons (of which two out of three live in developing 
countries), disabled people had been rather ignored during the first three decades of the United 
Nations’ existence” (Degener, 2000, p. 187). 
 
Although progress is apparent, the identification of persons with disabilities as a group 
requiring protection has been glacial.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
negotiated and ratified amidst the backdrop of Nazi World War II atrocities, neglected to identify 
persons with disabilities as a protected group.  Under Article II of the UDHR (1948), 
“[E]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”  Similarly, Article 16 of the UDHR fails 
to include persons with disabilities with race, religion and nationality as inappropriate limitations 
on the right to marriage.  Article 25, which pertains to an internationally accepted standard of 
living, does assert that every person has the “right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.”  This reference, however, conceptualizes disability as an individual condition – 
conforming to the medical model of disability – rather than as a sociopolitical construct, like 
race, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. 
 
In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly took a step forward, proclaiming the 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (Declaration on Mentally Retarded).  
The resolution called on member states to accord mentally retarded persons, “to the maximum 
degree of feasibility, the same rights as other human beings” (United Nations, 1971, paragraph 
[1]).  The right to medical care, economic security, community integration, and the right against 
exploitation and degrading treatment were some of the core principles of the resolution.  Four 
years later, the United Nations passed the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 
(Declaration on Rights of Disabled), effectively extending the protections of the Declaration on 
Retarded Persons to “any person unable to ensure by himself or herself, wholly or partly, the 
necessities of a normal individual and/or social life, as a result of deficiency, either congenital or 
not, in his or her physical or mental capabilities” (United Nations, 1975, paragraph [XXX]).  In 
contrast to the Declaration on Retarded Persons, the Declaration on Disabled Persons placed 
more overt emphasis on the protection of civil and political rights (United Nations, 1975, 
paragraph [4]).  In addition, the declaration seemed to proceed further in creating a distinct class 
of disabled persons, by according protection regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinions, national or social origin, state of wealth, birth or any other 
situation…” (United Nations, 1975, paragraph [2]). 
   
 
In 1982, The United Nations began implementation of its World Programme of Action 
Concerning Disability (World Programme on Disability).  The plan, described as a “an 
international long-term plan based on extensive consultations with Governments, organs and 
bodies within the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations” (World Programme of Action Concerning Disability, paragraph [9]), placed 
squarely on state governments the obligation of “awakening the consciousness of populations 
regarding the gains to be derived by individuals and society from the inclusion of disabled 
persons in every area of social, economic and political life” (United Nations, 1982, paragraph 
[1]).  The programme’s three core objectives – prevention, rehabilitation,viii and equalization of 
opportunities were to be applied to the rising global disabled population, with particular attention 
paid to the plight of disabled persons in developing countries (United Nations, 1982, paragraph 
[4]).ix  The vulnerability of women, children, the elderly, victims of torture, and refugees was 
also highlighted. 
 
With regard to planned international action to ensure the protection of disabled persons, 
the United Nations proposed a series of measures under the World Programme.  Of principal 
focus was the mobilization of economic resources; a trust fund was established to aid developing 
countries in realizing the objectives of the programme.  However, the programme’s clearest 
statement on human rights left the matter of accountability nebulous: “[I]ncidents of gross 
violation of basic human rights, including torture, can be a cause of mental and physical 
disability. The Commission on Human Rights should give consideration, inter alia, to such 
violations for the purpose of taking appropriate ameliorative action” (United Nations, 1982, 
paragraph [9]).  This statement articulates no specific punitive action that may be taken against 
the gross violators of the human rights of disabled persons.  The vagueness of “appropriate 
ameliorative action” may be politically sustainable, given that it extends the necessary legal 
latitude to assess each instance on a case-by-case basis.  However, the programme recognizes 
that states susceptible to violations against disabled persons should bear the substantial share of 
the burden of amelioration, but makes only a cursory mention of what might occur in the event 
those states either neglect their obligation or intentionally target disabled persons.  This omission 
is problematic and should not be immune to both legal and moral scrutiny. 
 
Toward a Convention for Disabled Persons 
 
At the close of the United Nation’s Decade on Disabled Persons (1983-1992) a Draft 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Disabled Persons was 
presented to, and subsequently rejected by, the General Assembly on the grounds that it would 
not be ratified by a majority of member states.  In lieu of a convention, which would have the 
force of international law, the United Nations Commission for Social Development convened an 
expert working group that developed the Standard Rules.  The Standard Rules, adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1993, attempted to reconcile disability as an individual’s functional 
impairment, and disability as social construction with implications of inferiority and consequent 
discrimination (Michailakis, 1999).  As an instrument that is not legally binding, its influence 
was only moral. 
 
   
The Standard Rules were followed in 1994 by the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ adoption of General Comment Number 5, which finally 
turned to a human rights approach to the interpretation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966) as applied to persons with disabilities.  
The General Comment made plain that “[i]n order to remedy past and present discrimination, 
and to deter future discrimination, comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation in relation to 
disability would seem to be indispensable in virtually all States parties.”  However, these 
emendations were a far cry from a binding treaty that could formally solidify the rights of 
disabled persons. 
 
In 2006, the United Nations completed the human rights shift by adopting the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Disability Convention).  It purports to “promote, 
protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity” (United 
Nations, 2006, Article 1).  Several obligations are imposed on states: passage of appropriate 
legislation, the abolition of discriminatory legislation, promotion of research and development, 
and training for disabled persons.  Certainly, the convention addresses many of the needs of 
disabled populations worldwide; however, it makes no mention of the historical connection 
between disability and genocide.  Although the convention represents a formidable step in the 
protection of persons with disabilities and received generous support from United Nations 
member states,x it remains to be seen whether it can reduce the likelihood of the most vulnerable 
population being victimized by mass killing, or whether the convention is a substitute for 
inclusion among the groups protected by the Genocide Convention. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the intimate connection between disability and 
genocide, and the need for disability to be included as a protected group under the Genocide 
Convention.  Some may argue that since the Holocaust, disabled persons have not been targeted 
as such, and thus, their inclusion is unnecessary.  Unfortunately, whether this is true is unclear 
because disabled genocide victims rarely have their stories told, as the Nazi case evidences.  Still 
others may argue that other international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, are sufficient 
to protect persons with disabilities.  While this may be true, genocide is the highest of all crimes, 
and inclusion, even if largely symbolic, would only accelerate the human rights movement for 
disabled persons.  It could also reinforce the international norm of equal opportunity for 
marginalized groups, enhance reputation effects for defectors from the Disability Convention and 
related instruments, as well as bring international political pressure to bear on states such as the 
United States, which has refused to sign the Disability Convention. 
 
In sum, international human rights law, as well as domestic laws and regional treaties, 
should embrace the human rights agenda of disabled persons.  This position fully acknowledges 
the bureaucratic fetters that inhibit international legal progress, in the form of bargaining among 
self-interested sovereign states, while at the same time imploring the United Nations and its 
member states to fulfill their roles as the vanguard of the socially marginalized and politically 
dispossessed.  Disabled persons should no longer be a race apart from their brethren when it 
comes to protection from genocide. 
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Endnotes
   
 
 
                                         
i By “etymological,” I refer quite simply to the history of words and concepts, the sources of those 
histories, the relationships between histories and the evolutionary trajectories those histories might travel. 
ii Ms. Wöld’s reference to her son as an “it” is indicative of the dehumanization of the disabled during the 
Nazi era.  The disabled’s lack of standing as sociopolitical beings even translated into the post-Holocaust 
legal realm, preventing many victims of the Nazi euthanasia program from securing a judicial remedy.  In 
his dissertation research, Shane Stufflet found that the killers of the disabled were treated much more 
leniently by courts than were the killers of Jews.  “More than half of the Nazis tried for crimes against the 
mentally handicapped – 57 percent – were acquitted … and only 1.6 percent received life sentences, none 
of which were served.”  Conversely, “only 24 percent of the Nazis tried for crimes against the Jews were 
acquitted, with about 11 percent receiving life sentences” (Ascribe Newswire, 2005).  Unlike Jews who 
were able to testify and potentially win judges sympathy, the mentally handicapped were unable to as a 
result of their limitations. 
iii Gallagher describes the German film I Accuse, in which a physician husband kills his wife because she 
has multiple sclerosis. 
iv The eugenics-inspired Nazi regime in Germany found a sibling in the United States, which also 
implemented policies aimed at “degenerates.”  These policies included forced sterilization, marriage 
restrictions, and segregation and were supported by an alliance between the mainstream medical 
establishment and the eugenics movement.  In the opinion of Sofair & Kaldjian (2000), “[t]he goals of 
eugenic sterilization in the United States and Germany were similar in that they aimed for improved genetic 
composition of their citizenry and hoped to create a society in which every individual was economically 
useful and the fiscal burden of institutionalization, crime, and charity were decreased” (p. 318). 
v “Ethnical” is a term used in the Genocide Convention. 
vi See for example,  Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro (International Court of Justice, 2007), 
which held that Serbia violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent 
genocide, but evidence was insufficient to show that Serbia committed genocide. 
vii Nazi Socialist propaganda envisioned three categories of disabled: (1) disabled veterans who here 
valorized as war heroes; (2) physically handicapped German Civilians, portrayed as being potentially 
rehabilitated; and (3) those who were deemed unfit, incapable of rehabilitation and a drain on the nation’s 
resources (Mostart, 2002).  Although the Nazis demonized the previous regime for its maltreatment of the 
war veterans, its record is no better.  Under the Nazis, the veterans were “[s]howered with rhetoric” and 
“psychologically manipulated and organized to support the regimes militaristic policies – policies that 
created millions of new veterans, who were then left to face the ruins of a second lost war” (Diehl, 1987, 
pp. 705-706). 
viii The issue of rehabilitation has also been addressed by conventions and recommendations by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), including but to limited to pronouncements in 1983, 1955 and 
1988. 
ix The report estimated that more than 500 million persons were afflicted with physical, mental or sensory 
impairments, “and at least 25 percent of any population is adversely affected by the presence of disability” 
(United Nations, 1982, (4)).  Factors identified as contributing the disabled person’s marginalization 
included wars, violence, poverty, geography, natural disasters, stress and urbanization. 
x Remarking upon the Disability Convention’s precursors, Argentinean Ambassador Roberto Garcia 
Moritán acknowledged the quest for integration by the 7.1% of the Argentine population that self-identifies 
as disabled.  See Statement by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Worship Ambassador 
Robert Garcia Moritán (March 30, 2007).  Representing the European Union, Parliamentary State Secretary 
in the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Franz Thonnes remarked that the long-term goal of 
the Disability Convention was to “change the way the public perceives persons with disabilities, thus 
ultimately changing society as a whole.”  See European Union Statement on the Occasion of the Signing of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (March 30, 2007). Thirty-eight other parties 
made statements at the signing ceremony. 
